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Vernacular Entanglements: Islam
and Communism in a Bulgarian
Village
Enchevêtrements vernaculaires : islam et communisme dans un village bulgare
Detelina Tocheva
1 Belan is a small village located in the southern part of the central Rhodope Mountains
of Bulgaria.1 In this locality, since the fall of state-socialism in 1989, notions of what
Islam is and how it should be practised have been interwoven tightly with notions of
communism.2 The local Muslims have Bulgarian as their first language and belong to
the  Sunni  Hanafi  strand;  they  are  also  known  as  Pomaks.3 Most  self-identify  as
Bulgarians, sometimes as Bulgarian Muslims.4 
2 All actively practising Muslims in Belan are elderly people, with pronounced religiosity
being considered unusual and inappropriate for all  those who do not belong to the
category of the “elderly.” The “elderly” (stari) are also called “retired” (pensioneri), a
term referring to the fact that they receive an old-age pension. To the present day,
some old persons have continued to be identified as “communists” even though the
Communist Party, to which they previously belonged, was renamed as Socialist in 1990. 
3 In describing some elderly villagers as “communists,” their co-villagers do not refer to
past Communist Party membership as such. Prior to the regime change in 1989 many
were members with no special commitment, and are not called “communist” today.
“Communist” means that a person had an active individual involvement in the Party
structures before 1989 and a pronounced past and/or current fidelity to the formerly
Communist, now Socialist, Party. In addition, a person expressing blunt admiration for
the  modernizing  effects  of  the  state-socialist  policies  in  terms  of  local  material
wellbeing, infrastructures and education, is also locally defined as a communist. 
4 In-depth  historical  studies  about  the  period  following  the  Communist  coup  on  9
September 1944 have pointed to complex relations between the Communist Party and
local Bulgarian Muslim communities.5 Since the beginning of my fieldwork in Belan in
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2009, I too have been faced constantly with the continuing importance of local notions
of  “communism”  and  “communist”  which  have  played  a  key  role  in  the  ongoing
renegotiation  of Islamic  practice.  Even  though  the  proponents  of  Islam  and
communism have been a few elderly persons, nearly everyone belonging to this village
community has become involved, or taken a position, in the plethora of heated debates
around religiosity and communism from the collapse of the regime to the present day.
The  empirical  data  presented  below  show  how  and  why  tensions  between,  and
combinations of, commitment to communism and commitment to Islam, are expressed
among  the  elderly,  and  how  they  are  perceived  and  negotiated  among  the  village
community. The analysis highlights the importance of unproblematic entanglements
and open controversies  for  contemporary social  relationships,  moral  reasoning and
community cohesion.
5 This article approaches Islam and communism as vernacular notions. I do not imply
that Islam and communism are equivalent categories; neither do I suggest that they are
comparable  in  their  theoretical,  ideological  and  scriptural  forms,  or  as  lived
experience.  Starting  from  empirical  evidence,  I  analyse  their  locally  meaningful
interrelatedness.  In  doing  so,  I  draw,  on  one  side,  on  authors  who  investigated
experience, practice and the agency-centred dimensions of Islam. Writing about Islam
in the Balkans, Henig and Bielenin-Lenczowska define vernacular Islam as “vernacular
Islamic cosmologies,  religious practice,  and moral reasoning and imagination in the
lifeworlds of Muslims.”6 Their definition overlaps with Elbasani and Tošić’s definition
of  “localized  Islam(s)”  stressing  individual  agency  and  the  role  of  personal
interpretations.  These  authors  argue  that,  while  referring  to  the  great  Islamic
tradition, Muslims act as “purposeful agents” who craft what they consider as correct
religious ideas and behaviour.7 Building on these approaches, my case study further
underscores  that  the  vernacular,  localized  Muslim  identity  and  practice  are
inextricably  enmeshed in  other  social  identifications  and experiences,  in  particular
related to what the people define as “communism.” 
6 Therefore,  on the other side,  I  take inspiration from Chris Hann’s seminal work on
postsocialism when I interpret the local vibrancy of “communism” as the continuing
importance  of  the  state-socialist  past  into  the  present,  even  though  this  past  is
becoming ever more distant, if not mythical.8 I add another layer to Hann’s analysis by
defining  the  multiple  locally  meaningful  dimensions  of  communism  after  1989  as
vernacular communism. The top-down policies of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism varied in
time and space, thus creating locally and historically different communist experiments.
Human  arrangements  on  the  ground,  aiming  to  cope  with  these  policies,  were
impressively  diverse.  After  the  collapse  of  the  regimes,  throughout  what  Caroline
Humphrey called “the wide field of postsocialisms,” “communism” became a ubiquitous
term  used  for  a  variety  of  purposes.9 Different  actors  have  purposefully  invoked
“communism”  and  “the  communists”  in  order  to  take  a  position  and  respond  to
contemporary  challenges.  “Vernacular  communism”  aims  to  capture  such  varying
invocations  of  “communism” as  contextually  meaningful  experiences,  practices  and
commitments. 
7 Anthropologists  working  on  Bulgaria  brought  rich  evidence  about  the  vibrancy  of
vernacular communism. During the three decades following the demise of the regime,
the term “communism” has been used widely with a variety of meanings by people
from different generations and social backgrounds. Dimitra Kofti analysed one of the
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most widespread usages, that referring to relations of power. In the 2000s, the factory
workers  among  whom  Kofti  conducted  fieldwork  where  faced  with  growing
precarization. They called “communists” the managers and the owners of the factory,
but  also  those  in  power  before  1989.  In  the  eyes  of  these  blue-collar  workers,
“communists” were not the proponents of a specific ideology but exploitative elites
who kept their dominant position irrespective of the regime change. Conversely, as
Kofti also noted, another particularly widespread meaning of “communists” in Bulgaria
refers to those considered unable to adapt to the conditions of the neoliberal system.10
More  generally,  “communists”  is  used  in  disparaging  comments  to  describe  some
persons or groups as weak, lacking a sense of individual enterprise and stuck in an
obsolete  longing  for  a  reliable  welfare  state.  Jana  Tsoneva  showed  how  this  latter
meaning pervaded debates around the 2013 pro- and anti-government protests. Those
who viewed themselves as flexible, creative, self-enterprising individuals, destined to
become  the  winners,  tended  to  depict  such  profiles  as  retrograde.11 In  this  sense,
describing somebody as a communist serves to deny the legitimacy of any public claims
she may articulate; her claims are pre-emptively dismissed as a remnant of a disavowed
past. As Gerald Creed argued, though longing for some aspects of the communist past
can  be  found  in  Bulgaria,  this  form  of  nostalgia  is  above  all  an  expression  of  the
ceaseless socioeconomic distress of postsocialism, not a project to restore the past.12 His
point  holds  particularly  true  for  those  people  from  Belan  who  continue  to  claim
attachment to communism.
8 In close resonance with Gerald Creed’s  analysis,  many of  the elderly inhabitants  of
Belan express a sense of having experienced modernization and progress towards a
better future “under communism,” meaning most often the last three decades before
1989, in contrast with the painful socioeconomic decline after this date. This is one of
the most popular meanings of Belan’s vernacular communism, the only one which is
personally  endorsed  by  a  few elderly  villagers.  Other  meanings  of  communism are
disparaging; being pointed out as an “old communist” by others is an unambiguous
expression of a strong disapproval or even condemnation of some elderly’s stubborn
conviction that communism had more valuable aspects than what came next, and of
the person’s arguable inability to live in the present. The continuing vote among the
elderly  for  the  Socialist  Party,  in  spite  of  the  obvious  absence  of  any  material  or
symbolic reward granted to the voters by those who get elected, is most commonly
interpreted as an evidence of such stubbornness, of a pointless, “retrograde attachment
to the past.”13 Finally, it is particularly disparaging to be called “a communist” when
the term is used to point to what is seen as the insincerity of those who were active
Communist Party members before 1989 and who suddenly started parading themselves
as pious and preachy Muslims right  after  the fall  of  the regime.  Clearly,  those few
persons who, right after the regime change,  abandoned their strong Party activism
overnight  and  embraced  religious  fervour  are  widely  described  as  hypocritical
“communists.”  Oft-unvoiced  memories  of  repression  against  religion,  of  aggressive
atheist  propaganda  and  the  stigmatization  of  Muslims  for  their  purported
backwardness  lurk  behind  people’s  condemnation  of  the  newfound  piety  of  some
“communists,”  former local  Party functionaries  who not  simply complied with,  but
personally implemented the regime’s merciless policies against other Muslims.
9 The  ethnography  of  the  multiple  tensions  and  entanglements  between  vernacular
communism and vernacular Islam found in a small community also aims to allow an
understanding  of  how  and  why  the  commitments  of  those  identified  as  elderly,
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including  people  who  passed  away  but  are  remembered  for  their  distinctive
engagement and doings, continue to raise empathy, disagreement or resentment. These
processes stretch far beyond the group of “the elderly.” People’s commitments, actual
and remembered, contribute to creating a sense of belonging and moral rightfulness
among the entire community, including those who live elsewhere and tend to come
back rarely to their home village, and those numerous locals who keep some distance
from  pronounced  religiosity.  For  all  these  people,  these  processes  help  make  and
remake  local  notions  of  Islam.  The  data  used  in  this  article  are  drawn  from  my
ethnographic fieldwork in the area of Belan, which began in 2009 with a ten-month
stay in the village. Since then, I have returned to the area almost every year for shorter
visits.
10 After a note about the local background, I describe the two main poles of collective
local life in which elderly villagers participate actively: the mosque and the retirement
club.  I  depict  combinations  and  conflicts  between  engagement  with  Islam  and
commitment to communism. Specific life trajectories, marked by major political shifts,
but  also  individual  choices  largely  determine  how every  one  of  the  elderly  people
positions her- or himself and how she or he is judged by co-villagers. I conclude that
the  past  and  current  engagements  of  the  elderly  villagers,  and  the  multiple
controversies  around these  engagements,  continue  to  play  a  role  in  shaping moral
reasoning and a sense of community among the younger generations.
 
The local background
11 Belan is a small village of 271 officially registered inhabitants as of 2019, according to
data provided by the mayor’s office. It is located in the area south from the town of
Smolyan, the regional centre.14 Belan, like most of the neighbouring villages, is what
the  local  people  call  “a  mixed  village.”  Here,  Sunni  Hanafi  Muslims  and  Orthodox
Christians have lived together for centuries. All locals have Bulgarian as their mother
tongue.  Muslims have always formed the majority;  now they outnumber by far the
Christians, who left en masse to larger cities during late state-socialism simply when
state policies made both upward social mobility and geographical mobility easier for
Christians  and  more  complicated  for  Muslims.  The  villagers  cultivate  a  sense  of
contained expression of religiosity and consider over-pronounced religious practice as
inappropriate.  This  notion  is  close  to  what  the  inhabitants  of  the  Albanian  city  of
Shkodra define as a distinctive “calmness,” a contained, “peaceful and participatory
attitude”  of  Christians  and  Muslims.15 Belan  is  a  highly  secularized  area  with  low
mosque  and  church  attendance,  even  though  the  local  mosque  and  church  have
undergone significant renovation after 1989 thanks to donations, and a minaret was
erected in 1993-1994.
12 The forms of Islam that most villagers consider as normal and authentic have been
shaped  profoundly  by  a  series  of  pre-socialist  and  socialist  policies  of  alternating
government-sponsored  repression  and  support,  and  state-promoted  norms  of
modernity  have  deeply  permeated  notions  of  what  are  appropriate  dress  codes,
behaviour and ritual life.16 Secularizing, pro-Bulgarian state-sponsored movements of
the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  an  outstanding  example  of  which  is  the
Smolyan-based  association  Rodina  (lit.  Homeland)  particularly  active  in  the  region
between 1937 and 1944,17 state-socialist  policies  of  forced secularization and name-
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change campaigns, presented as a necessary step towards modernization, accompanied
with intimidation and violence, but sometimes also readily embraced by some Muslims,
have left a durable imprint on the local people’s views of what it means to be a Muslim.
18
13 Globalization  has  become  another  important  feature  of  contemporary  vernacular
Islam. Everywhere in the Balkans, the limits between “local” and “imported” Islam are
blurred.19 As Laura Olson argued, among Bulgarian Muslims, views of what is Islam and
how  it  ought  to  be  practised  tend  to  be  shaped  by  direct  or  diffuse  reactions  to
widespread Islamophobia and national policies promoting Orthodox Christianity as the
marker of true Bulgarianness. Participation in work migration, Internet exposure and
the influence of Muslim networks from abroad that advocate newfound religiosities
also have an effect, as does a general “interplay between local and translocal discourse
and practices.”20 Belan’s inhabitants are no exception. It is nonetheless important to
acknowledge  that  the  local  people  themselves  distinguish  some  practices  not  as
“Muslim” in a universal way, but as “usual,” “ours,” “traditional,” or “our ways” – and
they do so irrespective of whether they approve of such practices or question their
correctness.21 Moreover,  over  the  past  three  decades  of  religious  liberalization,  in
Belan, claims to the (in)correctness of “usual” and “new” forms of Islam have referred
regularly to vernacular notions of communism.
14 Islam continues to be an important marker of identity, even though most people do not
show  external  signs  of  religious  belonging.  It  continues  to  play  a  role  for  the
contemporary  construction  of  individual  and  collective  identities,  and  for  the
maintenance of kin and local social bonds. This local situation differs from other parts
of  the  Rhodopes,  where  progressive  assimilation  of  the  younger  generations  to
Orthodox Christianity is replacing Islamic practice.22 Yet in other areas, local Islamic
practice has been reinvigorated among the Bulgarian Muslims thanks to trans-border
exchange with Greece and Turkey.23 Finally, commitment to globalized forms of pious
Salafism  and  Saudi-styled  norms  of  observance  and  outlook  have  become  very
noticeable in other localities, such as the neighbouring towns of Madam and Rudozem,
yet,  although  widely  reported  about  in  the  media,  they  have  not  proven  powerful
enough to undermine local, “usual” forms of religiosity.24 The people of Muslim origin
in Belan typically  see  themselves  as  different  from their  neighbours  in  Madan and
Rudozem. They argue that in these two localities Islam is followed more strictly. This
comparison  has  a  twofold  meaning:  some  villagers  express  regret  about  their  own
ignorance  of  correct  religiosity,  while  others  distance  themselves  from  their
neighbours from these two towns by considering them as more “backward.” The idea of
backwardness refers most usually to women’s dress, such as a long robe (manta), a veil,
whether colourful or darker introduced more recently, and overall intensive religious
practice.25 In  Belan,  the  Islamic  elements  in  domestic  and  local  rituals  are  often
downplayed and unpublicized. Islamic elements are spoken about as something which
is done as a custom and to please the elderly who are used to this way of celebrating. In
spite of this claimed weak religiousness, Islam has remained an underlying symbolic
component in the contemporary process of  making social  bonds and moral  worlds.
Notably, the elderly villagers play a key role in this process.
15 Indeed, in Belan and in the surrounding area, religious practice is usually considered to
be  related  to  old  age.  This  applies  to  local  Muslims,  as  well  as  to  local  Orthodox
Christians. This means that more active engagement with religion is considered normal
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for  those  women  and  men  who  have  reached  retirement  age.  Such  engagement  is
perceived as anomalous for the younger generations, including children and teenagers,
and also for those having active work lives and young children, and even generally for
those  who  may  have  few  responsibilities  but  have  not  reached  retirement  age.
However,  Islamic  rituals  effectively  support  an  intergenerational  relation  and,  in  a
reciprocal  way,  Islamic  practice  is  largely  sustained thanks  to  an  intergenerational
division  of  religious  labour.  Receptions  in  the  houses  for  childbirth  (molitvi,  lit.
prayers),  home-based  wedding  parties  (goste,  from  gost meaning  guest)  and
commemorations of a deceased family member (pomin, lit. commemoration) require the
participation of ritual specialists who are elderly persons and knowledgeable Muslims,
able to say prayers and/or read the Qur’an. The intergenerational relationships are
ambivalent  and  in  some  respects  strained.  For  example,  members  of  the  older
generation perform rituals and put in place religious-based events for the sake of the
entire  community,  such  as  the  village  kurban (a  major  collective  sacrificial  meal
organized in spring). The younger generations show deference to its organizers; they
are expected to attend, and in fact, they never miss kurban or other events like it. 26
Members  of  the  younger  generations  also  see  the  participation  of  elderly  ritual
specialists in their life-cycle rituals as a guarantee for the validity of these rituals. 
16 The equilibrium of generational roles, however, is under serious threat. The chain of
transmission of ritual knowledge and skills is being interrupted. None of the younger
men or women has so far shown interest in inheriting the knowledge of the old ritual
specialists. Deference and a sense of belonging to the Muslim community do not suffice
to insure transmission. The reason for this impending interruption is secularization in
the sense of a decline of religious practice and knowledge. Other Islamic authorities,
such as the head of the mosque who is affiliated with the district Islamic authority in
Smolyan, or unofficial proponents of Saudi-styled Islam (absent from Belan but present
in  other  parts  of  the  Rhodopes),  participate  in  shaping  some of  the  contemporary
dynamics of Islam. 27They do not, however, take over the usual tasks necessary to put in
place domestic and village religious events. 
17 Even  with  the  diminishing  transmission  of  ritual  knowledge,  there  is  a  continuing
reassertion of an Islam-based identity among the younger generations. The people of
Belan, and especially the younger generations, may seem to outsiders (including other
local Muslims) not only deeply secular but also to have a strong Christian bias. The
practices that local Islam has in common with Christianity are not perceived by the
great majority of local Muslims as syncretic forms of religion.28 This is true even with
respect  to  the burial  practices  which come to  the fore  in  arguments  about  how to
practice Islam. Both local Christians and local Muslims bury the deceased dressed in
clothes  and  placed  in  a  coffin;  both  place  a  stone  on  the  grave  that  carries  the
deceased’s name and photograph. Still, no matter their commonalities, a Muslim is not
a  Christian  and  every  local  inhabitant  knows  to  which  religious  group  she  or  he
belongs.
18 Sweeping out-migration for work is also a major cause for non-transmission of local
religious expertise.29 In line with the general trends in the Rhodopes since the early
1990s,  Belan  has  undergone  a  painful  combination  of  economic  and  demographic
decline.  Economic  depression,  however,  has  not  caused  a  direct  decrease  in  ritual
practice. Gerald Creed demonstrated that in the 1990s, ritual life sharply declined in
the Bulgarian countryside due to the sudden economic downturn. The villagers among
Vernacular Entanglements: Islam and Communism in a Bulgarian Village
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
6
whom he conducted fieldwork had simply no more money to organize any festivities,
let alone the lavish parties which they held in the 1980s.30 In Belan, I was told that the
domestic rituals had continued to be organized thanks to the produce from domestic
agriculture and animal breeding used to feed the guests also in the previous decades.
Therefore, religious domestic and village rituals did continue throughout the 1990s and
later. The general economic decline, however, has affected the availability of young
people, most of whom work at present in the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and in
larger Bulgarian cities. They tend to come back to their home village only for an annual
vacation. The general tendency towards depopulation means that some houses are not
in use anymore or are inhabited only during the summer. Hence, a decrease in rituals,
such as childbirth celebrations and weddings, derives from depopulation.
19 The relative prosperity of the village under late socialism, of which old villagers still
hold  dear  memories,  came  to  an  end  quickly  after  1989.  The  state-enforced
dismantlement of the state-run agricultural cooperative and the rapid closing of the
couple  of  small  industrial  plants  undermined  the  basis  of  local  employment.  This
closing precipitated the disappearance of symbolically valuable work identities.  One
could not anymore claim to be, for example, a school teacher. One had to turn into a
self-employed shopkeeper with an unclear professional future and an insecure income.
Several people tried to establish family businesses; most of these attempts failed. At the
moment,  the  village  has  a  small  wood-processing  plant  that  was  privatized  and
underwent  significant  downsizing,  and  a  shirt-making  factory  employing
approximately  thirty  women  on  ridiculously  low  salaries.  Shirt-making  factories
continue to hire women in this region. But the potential employees are often reluctant
to  accept  the  hard  working  conditions  and  notably  low  salaries.  The  crumbling
economy  caused  out-migration  which  in  turn  resulted  in  diminishing  numbers  of
schoolchildren;  therefore,  the  numbers  of  classes  and  teachers  dropped  too.  The
mayor’s office has gone through constant downsizing since I arrived in 2009, largely
because of the cuts made by the central municipal authorities in Smolyan to Belan’s
budget. There were four full-time employees and a mayor in 2009. By 2019, there was
one full-time employee (the mayor) and one half-time employee. 
20 Since 2011, Belan’s inhabitants have elected a mayor belonging to GERB, the central-
right party which has been the main party of the governing coalition since 2009, and to
which the mayor of Smolyan also belongs. This was a major shift after the village’s
long-term support of the Socialist Party (BSP) at all elections after 1989 for which Belan
had  gained  the  reputation  of  being  a  “red  village.”  It  was,  however,  a  personally-
motivated  shift  rather  than  an  ideological  one,  by  both  the  new  mayor  and  his
constituency.  The  new  mayor  had  been  a  well-respected  villager,  then  in  his  late
forties;  when he decided to run for the 2011 municipal election in Belan, he joined
GERB in  the  hopes  of  receiving  material  support  for  his  village  thanks  to  his  new
political  affiliation with  the  governing party.  But  no  such support  ever  came.  It  is
important to mention that no candidate of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms
(DPS), usually identified as the Party of the Muslims in Bulgaria, has ever been given a
majority of votes in the village during municipal and legislative elections. The voting
pattern until  2011 reflected the pro-socialist  orientation of the vast majority of the
active voters of that time, those who were in their fifties and older.
21 In variance with the bleak picture of the economy, Belan is a relative success story in
one specific sphere. The village has become famous for rural tourism over the past
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twenty years. The picturesque landscapes and the availability of high quality domestic
foods – such as milk and meat products, as well as home-grown vegetables, potatoes
and beans – have become good marketable assets. In addition, some of the numerous
houses that were erected or thoroughly renovated in the 1980s to become home to
three-generational families,  have now been adapted to offer bed and breakfast.  The
influx of tourists is mainly seasonal. The tourists are mostly Bulgarians who come for
recreation and hiking, but also groups of foreigners travelling in trips organized by
agencies for alternative tourism. Although no one lives from tourism alone, income
from this activity is a welcome addition to low salaries and revenues from more or less
official jobs. Old-age pensions are highly valued because they come in with regularity
compared to payments for more or less formal work. When retried people live with the
family of their daughter or son, their pension is often used to pay “the bills” (smetkite)
for electric, water, TV and the house-phone.
22 In Belan, the group of “the elderly” is highly variegated. There are several identity sub-
groups some of which are based on professional identity, while others are not. When I
settled in the village in 2009, veterans of the Second World War (frontovatsi), all male,
still numbered a few living members. They were identified with a sense of respect as
“veterans” by their co-villagers but did not gather in any formal structure. I suspect
that their group identity had been celebrated during the state-socialist regime, as it
was the case in the rest of the country, and that this long-lasting public recognition has
been incorporated into the grassroots symbolic social structure. Former workers from
the  state-run  cooperative  farm,  former  drivers  and  former  teachers  form  other
symbolically important sub-groups among the older villagers. The extreme forms of
identifications with “communism” and publicly stated Islamic practice are exemplified
by two poles, respectively, the retirement club (pensionerski klub), an association taking
cultural  and folkloric  initiatives,  and the mosque.  The members of  the club do not
attend the mosque, and vice versa. This bipolar structure of village sociality means that
claims to communism conflict with claims to Islam. Yet some elderly villagers combine
these claims smoothly, with the combination of the two being seen as unproblematic by
the village community. Besides the members of the club and the mosque attendees,
elderly local ritual specialists and villagers of different ages, female and male, partake
in pointing to contradictions between Islam and communism, and in defining their
acceptable overlapping.
 
The elderly and the upkeep of ritual life: mosque
dynamics and local ritual specialists
23 The practising Muslims form a small but symbolically important minority. Although
only a handful of old men attend the Friday prayer with some regularity, this weekly
gathering  is  perceived as  an  important  moment  on  the  unwritten  weekly  time
schedule.  Similarly,  evening  gatherings  in  the  mosque  during  the  holy  month  of
Ramazan also  attract  a  small  group of  worshippers.  The majority  of  non-observant
Muslims and Christians show respect during those evenings simply by mentioning that
“the elderly” are praying in the mosque. 
24 Here is a vignette to illustrate the kind of respectful attitude that I have encountered.
On a summer evening during Ramazan, when the sun had just started to go down, my
Muslim host family, some of our friends and I were sitting in front of the house, eating
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fresh salad and small pieces of grilled pork, enjoying the warm air and the beauty of the
landscape.  My host,  a  man then in  his  early  sixties,  and some of  our  friends were
drinking  rakia,  the  popular  Bulgarian  brandy.  We  transgressed  three,  even  four,
requirements of Islam: to abstain from eating and drinking during the daylight hours of
Ramazan; to abstain from pork; and to abstain from alcohol. At some point, we heard
the hodzha (imam) make the call to evening prayer. Even though the mosque is not
equipped with loudspeakers, it is easy to hear his voice through the village. My host
commented with an expression of solemnity: “Can you hear the hodzha singing? We
should not be drinking rakia now.” Yes, we confirmed, we did hear the hodzha singing.
Then we continued chatting,  and those  Muslims and Christians  who were drinking
alcohol continued to enjoy their drink. It was enough to acknowledge that everybody
understood  (at  least)  the  contradiction  between  drinking  alcohol  and  belonging  to
Islam. The moment of required forbearance, according to my host, was limited to the
moment when the hodzha is singing. Otherwise, to observe the requirements of Islam, it
was enough to show that we were aware of our transgression. Thanks to such small
arrangements most people at once pay respect to Islam, notably during Ramazan, and
circumvent its most basic rules. However, at another occasion, to which I return in
greater detail below, the Islamic ban on alcohol and pork was challenged on purpose in
public. This openly provocative act raised anger and resentment among the majority of
villagers.
25 If the sustained practice of Islam is related to old age, in reality this means that only a
handful of elderly people go to the mosque, pray at home and/or have some deeper
knowledge of Islam. These expressions of faith do not necessarily overlap; one person
can go to the mosque but not pray at home, or one may pray but be unable to read the
Qur’an. When I began fieldwork in 2009, around twenty old men used to gather in the
mosque for the Friday prayer. Most of the non-official local ritual specialists were part
of  the group.  In  summer 2018,  this  group had shrunk significantly,  with only  nine
regular male attendees. In Belan, two categories of Islamic specialists are called hodzhi
(sing. hodzha). The first are official representatives of organized Islam officiating in the
mosque.  They are placed under the authority of  the district  mufti  in Smolyan.  The
second category includes the local traditional ritual specialists. I use “traditional” for
the ritual specialists who have no formal training, are not affiliated with any official
authority and do not advocate new, for instance Saudi-styled, forms of Islam – but this
is not to imply that tradition is an unchanged entity, untouched by overall political and
cultural  transformations;  quite  to  the  contrary.  The  tremendous  upheavals  of  the
twentieth century have profoundly shaped those Islamic practices and views which
have become part of the local norm. The traditional, non-official hodzhi are said to be
“ours,” or “old hodzhi,” while the ritual specialist from the mosque is called “the hodzha
of the mosque.” There is no competition between these two authorities, since there is a
clear division of religious labour between them. Moreover, most of those considered as
knowledgeable local Muslims and/or hodzhi have tended to attend regularly the Friday
prayer  from  the  1990s  onwards,  irrespective  of  who  is  the  mosque  hodzha.  The
reputation of the different mosque hodzhi has been at the heart of conflicts, but the
legitimacy of the office itself is commonly recognized.
26 In addition, a small group of elderly female mosque-goers had formed a few years prior
to my arrival.  They used to  attend the mosque together during the holy month of
Ramazan. In September 2009, at the end of Ramazan, I asked a friendly elderly lady,
who was also my neighbour, if I could join her at the mosque. I was concerned about
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the reaction of the hodzha,  a young man from a neighbouring village who had been
appointed shortly before, and whether the other faithful would find my presence as a
non-Muslim inappropriate. My neighbour rejected all my concerns with a wonderful
smile and brought me to the mosque that same evening. Other women joined us on the
way. None of them seemed to find my presence problematic: “If you want to come it is
natural that we let you in,” I was told. Or: “Don’t worry, the hodzha won’t object. And
even if he asks something we will tell him that you are with us, that we invited you.” On
that evening, there were ten men and six women, all of them elderly villagers. When
the men and the hodzha saw me entering the mosque, they greeted me and no one
asked why I was there. My trousers and my uncovered head did not attract the slightest
inspective gaze, not to speak of disapproval. I was dressed in the casual style of most
women of my age in the region. All people in Belan knew me personally or indirectly
and they knew that I was not of Muslim origin. Before the prayer, the women and men
exchanged gifts of cookies, sweets and boxes of fire matches. I was offered gifts too.
Being unaware of this practice, I was not prepared to offer a return gift. A few months
before my arrival in Belan, the hodzha had imposed to separate the space of the men
from  that  of  the  women  with  a  curtain.  He  had  argued  that  it  was  not  “decent”
(prilichno)  to  let  men  and  women  pray  together.  Indeed,  upon  our  arrival  and  the
exchange of gifts, he pulled a large red curtain dividing the room in two parts: the
women in the bottom, the men and the hodzha in the front. Standing on the women’s
side, we were perfectly able to hear the hodzha speaking but could not see the men (nor
they us). During the prayer, I was invited to stay with the women and simply follow
what was going on.
27 My neighbour had started going to the mosque and, in her own words, learning how to
pray (klaniam se, lit. to bow) and observing the fast (goveene) around 1999. Before that,
she had never gone to the mosque. Another elderly woman among those who came to
the mosque that evening told us that she knew Muslim prayers since her childhood.
Nonetheless, she had started frequenting the mosque a few years earlier, right after
retirement. In fact, none of them, they said, had been to the mosque before 1989, as this
was something that “only the elderly did.” When I asked the women if they were able
to understand what the hodzha was saying, one of them replied: “We cannot understand
because  he  utters  the  prayers  in  Turkish.”  Another  one corrected her:  “No,  this  is
Arabic.” In any case, none of them was able to understand. My neighbour intervened
with a clarification which I had already heard before, namely that in this region the
people do not have this kind of knowledge. “But in Madan and Rudozem, the women
know the prayers, even the young girls while they are still children.” There was a note
of praise in her voice for those knowledgeable Muslims of the two nearby towns. For
these women, another evidence of the locals’ weak knowledge was the fact that the
worshippers could not confirm that the mosque hodzha himself was able to understand
what he said in Arabic. But this did not seem to raise any criticism among the women
who attend prayers.
28 Such an uncritical attitude is by no means shared throughout the village. Generally, the
villagers do not hold this hodzha in high esteem. He is very young age (just 19 in 2009),
but the greater problem is his questionable knowledge. My hosts and numerous other
villagers questioned his linguistic skills in Arabic, and it was said that he had no special
religious education. The villagers admitted that he never pretended to be highly versed
in religious  matters,  and in  this  they granted him a smidge of  respect  because his
personal modesty contrasted with the behaviour of the two previous learned imams.
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Still,  since the moment the young hodzha had assumed office,  the reputation of his
grandmother  had  also  undermined  his  credibility.  His  grandmother,  an  elderly
energetic and talkative lady who had an orchard near Belan, was known for her foul
language.  In  more  recent  years,  villagers  commented  that  the  young  hodzha has
attended Islamic courses and gained some self-confidence.
29 The villagers’  attitude of  combined criticism and tolerance towards the young man
appeared as a sort of privileged treatment in comparison with the hard time accorded
to his predecessors. According to narratives commonly told in the village, there was
one truly despised hodzha. He had arrived from Rudozem at the end of the 1990s as the
first learned hodzha in Belan. He pretended, so I was told, to be bringing along superior
knowledge about how to be a Muslim. Local practice was wrong, he said, and claimed
that the local people who thought of themselves as Muslims were totally ignorant of
their own religion. Most villagers perceived his constant critiques as offending. The
elderly faithful continued to frequent the mosque without taking position. 
30 Finally, an open conflict opposed the villagers to the hodzha. In 2007, a widely respected
teacher, a woman in her thirties, was diagnosed with cancer and soon passed away. Her
mother wanted a good burial for her deceased daughter, meaning that she expected
that her daughter’s body would be dressed, laid in a coffin and covered with kefin (the
Islamic shroud), and that a speech would be given during the burial ceremony at the
cemetery. Usually, such a speech is delivered by the mayor. The hodzha found these
requirements unacceptable – insisting that they were too elaborate for a Muslim burial
which should have preferred the body to be shrouded but not dressed, buried directly
in the ground, and with little ceremony – and refused to officiate at the burial. The two
elderly village women who usually washed the body of a deceased person and prepared
it for burial followed the instructions of the hodzha and refused to dress the teacher’s
body. The family of the deceased woman was outraged. They turned to the “hodzha in
chief,”  the  district  mufti  in  Smolyan,  who  accepted  their  requirements,  came  and
officiated  at  the  funeral.  The  most  knowledgeable  traditional  hodzha also  officiated
during the burial, side-by-side with the mufti from Smolyan. “We buried her with a
speech, as it should be. How can you bury a human being and not pronounce a word!”
my hostess, an energetic woman born in 1961, commented two years after the event. In
the eyes of the immense majority of villagers, the ceremony was executed “as it should
be.” Because the mufti from Smolyan and the local traditional hodzha officiated, in the
eyes of  the majority of  villagers,  the ritual  satisfied the common expectations.  The
mosque hodzha, after this collective denial of his authority, got offended and left the
village.
31 Another  hodzha came  then,  again  from  Rudozem.  Practising  and  non-practising
villagers tend to praise him for his ability to work with children – several teenagers
learned to read the Qur’an thanks to him and celebrated this achievement with a hatim
ritual – and for his actual good knowledge of Islam. But villagers also say that, exactly
like his predecessor, he expressed criticism towards the local forms of religion, arguing
that in Belan the people had practised the wrong Islam for generations. He also refused
to bury deceased villagers in a dressed state and in a coffin, and did not want to hear
about speeches during the burial ceremony. “He used to say that we are not believers
here, that we don’t know anything. He used to have dinner with us sometimes. We, the
people  from  the  village,  used  to  feed  him,”  my  hostess  recounted.  Some  villagers
reported to me that, in spite of his claims to correct Islam, he used to drink beer and
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play  cards.  Rapidly,  disagreements  loomed  up  around  issues  of  correct  burial  and
mutual accusations of lack of conformity with the Islamic norms of conduct. As a result,
this hodzha also left. This is when the young man from the neighbouring village was
offered to officiate in the mosque. In spite of his questionable knowledge of Arabic and
Islam, the villagers seem to accept him, as he continues to hold his position as I am
writing.
32 Religious authority in Belan is by no means restricted to the mosque hodzha. In fact,
traditional ritual specialists, some of whom are also called hodzhi, officiate at virtually
all life-cycle religious rituals, and during village and house-based kurbani (sing. kurban).
The mosque hodzha does not take part in these celebrations, with the notable exception
of the funeral. One can become a traditional ritual specialist when one is chosen by an
older traditional hodzha. There may also be an agreement among several of the older
hodzhi upon the initiation of a younger one. An old revered hodzha, a man employed for
many years at the state-run cooperative farm, refused to initiate a younger follower
and his knowledge was lost when he passed away in 1989. His decision did not interrupt
the  tradition,  as  there  were  other  ritual  specialists  able  to  secure  continuity  by
officiating at the rituals. When I arrived in Belan in 2009, twenty years had passed after
his death. In spite of this long period, his decision continued to raise incomprehension
and a sense of  loss for the entire community.  Another widely respected traditional
hodzha, whom I had the chance to meet, passed away recently. He also refused to choose
a  follower  and  gave  no  explanation  for  his  decision.  In  fact,  one  can  also  acquire
reputation as a knowledgeable and pious Muslim by self-study, as did the last man who
is currently identified as a hodzha in Belan. When I asked him in summer 2018 (when he
was 75) if he wanted to pass his knowledge on to a younger person, he answered that he
would like to do so. But then he added: “To whom can I pass on? No one is interested.”
He echoed the widespread sense of a crisis in transmission mentioned above.
33 An interruption in the formal transmission of knowledge, from senior hodzhi to junior
ones, regardless of who is responsible, may not be total. Local religious specialists and
“knowledgeable Muslims” may still emerge from within the community. After all, there
is  no expectation that  one individual  should possess  the totality  of  knowledge and
skills;  different  individuals  can master  specific  parts  of  them. Even now,  there is  a
division of religious labour among the observant elderly. It is just that those granted
the grassroots title of hodzhi are considered to be more knowledgeable and pious than
the others.  For example,  once I  attended a wedding party in a house (goste)  where,
before the arrival of the guests, five old persons, four men and one woman, said mevliuti
for the young couple.31 Two of the men were called hodzhi, but the woman and the other
man were known simply for their ability to read the Qur’an. All of them were ritual
specialists in their own way. 
34 There are  many such skills  taken up by the elderly  in  the community.  For  several
decades, one man has specialized in reading prayers during the kurban ritual slaughter.
I will return to his case below. Since the early 1990s, an elderly married couple has
specialized in cooking the ritual meal keshkek, made of sacrificial mutton and wheat,
prepared at home for religious events and for the village kurban.32 The couple is known
for their good observance of Islam, even though neither the husband nor the wife go to
mosque,  but  simply  pray  at  home.  In  sum,  various  forms  of  piety  and  knowledge
authorize access to the informal status of religious specialist  and ritual expertise is
distributed, not concentrated.
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The multiple facets of the “communists”
35 As mentioned above, mosque attendance excludes participation in the retirement club.
However,  there  are  many  possible  entanglements  of  commitment  to  Islam  and
commitment to  communism,  as  there are clashes.  A dozen of  men and women are
actively  involved  in  the  club,  a  formal  organization  established  in  the  1990s  that
continues to play a prominent role in the life of the village. Retirement clubs were
initially established in 1964 throughout the country. They became a popular form of
socializing in the 1980s and have continued to expand in the 1990s. Their members
usually define themselves by their collective spirit,  the origins of which they see as
rooted  in  the  state-socialist  system.33 Since  my  arrival  in  Belan,  the  most  active
members have been four married couples of Muslim origin and a few Christian and
Muslim women. The club gathers once per week in a large room in the building of the
village chitalishte, an institution typical of the Bulgarian villages and towns, designed to
host cultural and art activities, where there is usually a library and a theatre hall. The
club performs folkloric songs at village events, has established partnerships with fellow
clubs from the Smolyan region and from distant parts  of  the country,  and actively
participates in folkloric song contests organized by the national network of retirement
clubs. Although only the head of the club held a prominent position in the Communist
Party and has kept renewing his membership in the Socialist Party after 1989, the club
as a group is considered to have a communist orientation.
36 The behaviour of the club members caused a strong dispute a couple of years ago on
the day of  the annual  village kurban,  the  most  prominent  village  event  since  1992.
Villagers reported the story, as I was not present at that moment. As usual, virtually all
the inhabitants,  with their relatives,  work colleagues and guests from neighbouring
villages were gathering on the main square to share the sacrificial meal organized by
the people of Belan. The event takes place on a Saturday. The Friday before the public
part,  elderly  Muslim  men  gather  in  the  mosque  for  a  special  prayer.  Before  the
slaughter  of  each  sheep,  the  meat  of  which  is  used  to  cook  keshkek,  an  elderly
traditional ritual specialist says an Islamic prayer. During the ritual meal, there is no
alcohol. The Islamic elements are not publicized, but they are not hidden on purpose
either; they are somewhat downplayed while being known to the local people. There
are  no  competing  claims  to  establish  a  Christian  monopoly  over  the  ritual.  One
participates as a guest when one is related to Belan by his origin, or as an inhabitant of
a  neighbouring  village, or  because  one  has  friends  or  family  in  Belan.  Everyone  is
welcome, irrespective of religious belonging.34
37 On the day of kurban, the head of the retirement club decided to organize an alternative
festive  gathering  in  the  room  of  the  club,  on  the  premises  of  the  chitalishte.  The
members of the club started sharing a meal of grilled meatballs made from minced
pork (kiufteta) and salads. The meal was accompanied with rakia. As there are cooking
facilities next to the room used by the club, the club members often treat themselves
with a festive lunch or dinner. I was also kindly invited in previous years to share a
meal during their meetings. This practice of festive socializing usually raises sympathy
among the other villagers. But when somebody reported that on the day of the village
kurban, a few meters away from the main square where the sacrificial food was being
distributed,  the  club  members  were  eating  pork  and  drinking  alcohol,  the  kurban
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organizers felt outraged by what they felt was a blatant provocation. The club members
were compelled to leave their room and join the village event.
38 Some of the women who usually take part in the organization of kurban and serve the
food told me that the head of the club,  “this old communist,” had gone too far by
crossing the commonly accepted code of conduct on the annual kurban celebration. For
the women, “communist” encapsulates unambiguous criticism. The head of the club,
however,  claims  his  personal  commitment  to  the  Communist/Socialist  Party  as  a
positive marker of his individual identity. In one of our first conversations, I had asked
him if he was of Christian or Muslim origin, as his name did not allow me to guess. His
first  and family  names are  identical  to  those  of  a  prominent  Bulgarian Communist
leader. His wife wears a loosely knit scarf under her chin, neither too colourful nor too
dark, just as do many elderly Muslim and Christian women in Bulgaria, but her name is
a typical Bulgarian Christian one. I was not sure how to guess, and so I asked. I received
an unexpected answer: “I am not a Christian and I am not a Muslim. For me there is the
Party and nothing else! The Party brought me up because I was an orphan from my
early childhood.” At that moment,  I  did not dare to ask him more questions about
identity  and  religious  affiliation.  His  answer  boiled  down  to  claiming  atheism  and
refusing to discuss religious identity, and cut the possibility to ask further questions
related to this issue. In the following months, I befriended his sister, son, daughter-in-
law and two of his grandchildren. It became clear to me that he was born to a Muslim
family. I was not able to understand if he had chosen to take the name of the famous
Communist leader during the name-change campaign in 1972, or if this name had been
given to him in his  childhood.  No one ever calls  him with his  Turkic-Arabic name,
contrarily to what happens sometimes for those who have also a Christian-Slavic name.
39 The head of the club is a controversial  figure not only because he explicitly claims
atheism and fidelity to the Communist Party, nor because he organized the gathering
described above. He has been a controversial figure for a long time. It seems that he
was personally on the initiative of the destruction of the minaret in 1975-1976, when he
was the village mayor. I was told that he and the village secretary of the Communist
Party destroyed the minaret with their  own hands.  Villagers said that the two had
claimed to have received an order from Smolyan, but after 1989, when the archives of
this period became accessible, villagers from Belan went to Smolyan to search for the
order. They found no trace of such a document, and the village gossip claims that the
destruction of the minaret was personally initiated by the village mayor and the Party
secretary. The controversy around this issue continues. In 2010, I met the former Party
secretary, who lives in Smolyan with his children and rarely visits his home village. In a
conversation on a different topic, he unexpectedly told me that in 1975 or 1976, he and
the mayor had received the order to destroy the minaret. I knew from local narratives
that  this  man  also  participated  actively  in  the  repressions  against  his  Muslim  co-
villagers initiated by the state in the 1970. I thus avoided asking any question regarding
these events, lest he prematurely put an end to discussing the topics I had requested
initially. His mention of the order to destroy the minaret was, I guess, a way to tell me
his truth, as he must have supposed that other villagers had already told me a different
version of the story. 
40 In the version he told me, the destruction was justified to some degree by more than an
official order. As I had heard from several narratives, after the minaret was destroyed,
its foundations were seen to be in the form of a hexagon, which is the usual form of a
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church  bell  tower.  The  former  Party  secretary  told  me  that  this  meant  that  an
Orthodox church was there before the mosque. Indeed it is possible,  as people who
condemn the destruction of the minaret also point out, that an earlier church had been
transformed into a mosque, as often happened in the Ottoman Balkans.35 Thus, so I
understood the former secretary to suggest, the destruction had achieved some kind of
historical justice. 
41 The head of the retirement club, for his part, continues to this day to refuse discussing
events related to religious identity with me. He also avoids discussing his involvement
in anti-Muslim initiatives of the past. It would seem that he fully pursues an atheist
communist identity. But this is not quite so.
42 Actually, participating in Christian Orthodox rituals is a way for him to reassert his
communist identity.  Indeed, Christian Orthodox norms provided in some respects a
template  for  state-socialist  secularizing policies.36 This  was  also  the  case  of  earlier
movements, the most famous of which is the locally influential association Rodina. This
long-term re-education has left a durable imprint not only on what is considered to be
a Muslim, but also on what is considered to be a “communist” approach to Islam and
Orthodoxy. 
43 Here is an example. When a respected villager of Christian origin passed away, a service
was held in the church. Most villagers of Muslim origin who came to the service stood
outside of the church, near the entry. They waited there until the service ended and
then went together with those who had been inside the church to go together to the
grave. There, everyone witnessed the burial and the speeches made by the mayor and
friends of the deceased. In contrast to their reluctance to enter the church, Muslim
villagers  will  enter  the  house  of  a  deceased  Christian  and  perform  mainstream
Orthodox ritual acts there, such as lighting a candle. But even lighting a candle for the
deceased in a church – the same gesture as what they do in a family house – does not
seem appropriate to the immense majority of local Muslims.37 
44 The head of the retirement club challenged this local norm too. During that particular
funeral, not only did he enter the church but he also stayed inside until the end of the
service, a candle in his hand. He stood quite far from the altar and, being an outspoken
atheist, also at some distance from the priest. But he was nevertheless inside and held a
candle as most Christians did.
45 The  head  of  the  club  provides  the  most  radical  example  of  a  local  sense  of
incompatibility  between communism and Islam.  In  another  case,  some local  people
criticized those few former communists who had engaged with Islam right after the fall
of the regime. “When democracy came, all the communists went to the mosque,” my
hostess explained, expressing criticism for what she found was pure hypocrisy. A well-
known example was provided by a villager who was an active Party member until 1989
and who started to strongly advocate new Islamic norms after the regime shift. When I
first met him in 2009, he told me that Islam is the most demanding religion because it
appeared after Judaism, which was particularly indulgent, and after Christianity which
was stricter than Judaism but less so than Islam. Islam was, according to him, the most
demanding religion because it was the most elaborate. The immense majority of the
villagers  were  unfamiliar  with  the  new  norms  professed  by  this  former  Party
functionary, which they found unacceptable and offending. Among these new norms,
the most shocking requirement seemed to be again burying a deceased person without
a coffin and without a speech. Moreover, as the previous involvement of this man with
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the Communist  Party was widely known, his  ideological  about-face raised reactions
ranging from mockery to hostility. Villagers assessed his advocacy for new Islamic rules
through the  lens  of  his  recently  abandoned  affiliation  with  communism.  This  man
passed away a few years ago well into his eighties, but his preachy attitude continues to
be remembered overwhelmingly with a sense of resentment.
46 Yet, a combination of (former) commitment to communism and Islamic practice does
not necessarily lead to conflict. The members of the retirement club do not avoid all
Islamic rituals; for instance, in their houses, many slaughter sheep on the occasion of
Kurban Bayram. They also participate in Islamic rituals as a group, as I was able to
witness. Once I was attending a home reception organized as a commemoration (pomin)
of a man on the fifty-second day after his death. This kind of gathering is preceded by
prayers said by the local traditional hodzhi. A sacrificial animal is killed and cooked and
a meal is offered to kin, neighbours, friends and work colleagues who pay a visit to the
family of the deceased. Usually, people from the same family arrive as a small group;
sometimes a group is formed by several persons living in the same neighbourhood.
Some  groups  leave,  others  arrive;  the  trickle  can  continue  until  the  end  of  the
afternoon. During that particular reception, the guests arrived in small groups as usual,
talked  to  the  widowed  hostess  and  then  were  served  food.  When  our  group  was
preparing  to  leave,  around  ten  of  the  members  of  the  retirement  club  arrived,
including the head of the club. One of the villagers present in the house announced
their arrival:  “The retirement club is  coming.” The members of the club came as a
group  and  observed  the  usual  rules  of  conduct  for  such  occasions.  This  situation
seemed perfectly normal to those present; it did not elicit any comment or expression
of surprise,  let  alone criticism. Exactly like everybody,  the retirement club (and its
leader) took part in the collective commemoration, talked to the widow and ate from
the ceremonial keshkek.
47 Nor  is  Islamic  piety  necessarily  perceived  as  antithetic  to  sympathy  for  things
associated  with  the  communist  regime.  Ironically,  the  villagers  used  to  call  by  the
nickname Lenin one of the religiously knowledgeable men (he has since passed away at
the age of ninety). He was given this nickname simply because his family name was
similar to that of the famous Bolshevik leader. I had numerous conversations with the
local Lenin in the coffee shop where he was used to drop by for a coffee and chat after
the Friday prayer. He used to attend the mosque with great regularity. This gentle old
man  was  by  no  means  identified  as  a  “strong  communist.”  He,  however,  like  the
immense majority of the elderly, irrespective of their political orientation, expressed
nostalgia for the period of great prosperity, as the 1980s are remembered in the area.
“Lenin” was proud too, like the rest of Belan, of a villager (his neighbour) who made a
career as a deputy in the National Assembly in the 1960s. The deputy was of Muslim
origin and had done much to improve the infrastructure in his village. Thanks to him,
electricity first arrived in Lenin’s house, as the latter told me proudly, and soon after in
all  the  other  houses. 38The deputy  was  still  praised  for  his  energy  and efficacy,  as
“resourceful” (opraven),  and for his  active support  to the betterment of  local  living
conditions.
48 The case of another man (born in 1933) provides a similar example of an unproblematic
entwining of Islamic practice with sympathy for the Communist/Socialist Party. He is
the one who utters prayers at the different kurban slaughters. He showed me his notes
of Arabic diva prayers written with Cyrillic letters, the only alphabet that he is able to
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use. He told me that he did not understand what it meant. He knows that these are
sacred texts; this is enough for him and for all the villagers who have recourse to him
as a ritual specialist of kurban slaughter. He told me that when he was a young man, by
1965, he worked in the state-run cooperative farm. He then started to specialize in
animal slaughter. The old hodzhi decided to initiate him to the prayers to be uttered
during a ritual animal killing. From them he received the pieces of paper written in
Cyrillic letters that he has been using ever since.
49 This man is not a mosque-goer; neither does he belong to the retirement club. He has
reputation for always voting for the Socialist Party. He is one of those elderly persons
whom younger  villagers  call  “strong communists”  (silni  komunisti).  In  2011,  a  small
group of villagers campaigned against the Socialist mayor who was preparing to run for
a fourth term. Speaking of this ritual specialist, they told me that they found it useless
to try to persuade this “strong communist” to change his mind and give his vote to a
non-socialist candidate. But this man had a good reason for that, as he told me. On the
one hand, he had suffered from the regime, in particular from the harsh measures
adopted by  the  socialist  state  against  the  villages  located  close  to  the  border  with
Greece in 1948-1949.39 Many families, including his, were displaced to another region
and were later allowed to return. This traumatic experience was followed by forced
collectivization,  a  violent  name-change  campaign  in  1972  and  strong  state  control
aiming to eradicate religious practice in the subsequent years. This is when the grave
stone placed on his  father’s  grave  was  removed and disappeared,  even though the
father’s name was written in Bulgarian, according to the state-enforced standard, as
this  man told me.  Yet,  on the other hand,  he underscored that local  arrangements
allowed religious practice to continue throughout the period of state-socialism: “We
have always slaughtered animals for Bayram. Even the Party activists.” The sacrificial
animals were killed in the barn and their skin buried in the earth. The mayor would
always tell him in advance when state controllers were about to come: “The mayor used
to tell me: ‘I am telling you [that controllers are coming], but do what you have to do.’”
We were primitive before the collective farm, he told me: “The people used to plough
with oxen.” Despite the hardships it brought, the socialist state – as he saw it – had
brought prosperity to all. 
50 The material progress achieved for everyone is a main argument brought forward by
other  “strong communists”  of  this  man’s  generation who are  not  ready to  give  up
voting for Socialist candidates. This form of commitment to communism by no means
encapsulates  a  project  to  restore  the past.  It  expresses  a  sense  that  state-socialism
brought modernity, but also a sense that the era of material betterment came to an end
with the arrival of “democracy.” “Would Todor Zhivkov have lasted ten more years, it
would have been even better here,” a member of the retirement club, a man of Muslim
origin, told me once.40 His remark was meant less to discuss what the communist leader
really did; it rather suggested that, in this village like in other Pomak villages, from the
point of view of modernization and overall material improvement, the regime change
of 1989 has been largely experienced not as “a journey from ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism’,
but rather from socialism to its epilogue,” as Lenka Nahodilova aptly phrased it.41 This
shared sense of painful decline among the elderly makes religious repression of the
socialist past appear not only as more bearable, but perhaps even as preferable, and the
words of the ritual slaughter specialist cited above can be interpreted in this way.
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Conclusion
51 Since the demise of state-socialism, “communism” in its multiple vernacular meanings
has  been  related  to  stormy  quarrels  about  innovation  in  Islamic  norms,  but  also
entangled  with  the  quiet  continuation  of  usual  Islamic  practice.  An  overwhelming
majority of people from Belan, including those who have left to other places and abroad
and who keep returning home, unanimously hold communism for an outdated ideology
on  the  way  to  extinction;  its  specific  mixture  of  modernizing  achievements  and
antireligious  repression  belongs  to  the  past.  In  the  eyes  of  most  local  people,  the
transmission  of  the  knowledge  and  skills  of  the  old  hodzhi and  ritual  specialists  is
following the same trajectory. Ironically, however, over the past three decades, notions
of  communism  and  Islam  have  fuelled  the  crafting  of  moral  codes  integral  to  the
making of social bonds for the entire community. Processes of combining some features
of vernacular communism and vernacular Islam, and processes of erection of moral
fences  between  them,  have  contributed  to  the  collective  negotiation  of  notions  of
decency, rightfulness and community.
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ABSTRACTS
Throughout the three decades following the demise of  state-socialism in Bulgaria,  the terms
“communism” and “communist” have been used continuously by all kinds of actors to respond to
a  plethora  of  contemporary  challenges.  Based  on  ethnographic  research  in  a  village  in  the
Rhodope Mountains among Bulgarian Muslims, this article examines how various meanings of
“communism” and “communist” have been called upon constantly by members of all generations
in order to negotiate Islamic practice and codes of conduct, those deemed local and usual, and
those considered as imported from the outside.
Au cours des trois décennies qui ont suivi le démantèlement du socialisme d’État en Bulgarie, les
termes « communisme » et  « communiste » ont continuellement été utilisés  par toutes sortes
d’acteurs  afin  des  répondre  à  une  pléthore  de  défis  contemporains.  Basé  sur  une  recherche
ethnographique  dans  un  village  des  Rhodopes  parmi  des  Bulgares  musulmans,  cet  article
examine les manières dont différentes significations de « communisme » et « communiste » ont
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constamment été usitées par des membres de différentes générations pour négocier la pratique
islamique et les codes de conduite, ceux vus comme locaux et habituels, comme ceux considérés
comme importés de l’extérieur.
INDEX
Geographical index: Bulgarie, Rhodopes
Keywords: Islam, communism, Bulgarian Muslims, Bulgaria
Mots-clés: islam, communisme, Bulgares musulmans, Bulgarie
AUTHOR
DETELINA TOCHEVA
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France
Groupe Sociétés, Religions, Laïcités (CNRS-EPHE-PSL Research University Paris)
tocheva.detelina[at]gmail.com
Vernacular Entanglements: Islam and Communism in a Bulgarian Village
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
22
